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ABSTRACT 
Many developed countries have proposed enlarging the mandate of the WTO to protect 
the environment and labor rights. The idea was fiercely challenged by third-world countries 
becoming an unsurpassable obstacle in the negotiations. For supporters of a stronger WTO, the 
TRIPS Agreement is a good example that underscores the need to back up the trading system to 
enforce standards. This analysis attempts to demonstrate that there are less controversial 
alternatives to achieve environmental and social goals. The different nature of IPR and labor 
rights makes the TRIPS Agreement a weak example to prove the goodness of enforcing 
standards through the WTO. Moreover, certain gaps in this Agreement provide developing 
countries wit enough reasons to believe that a broader WTO scope would serve to disguise 
protectionist measures. Overarching the WTO members with obligations other than those which 
led their incorporation would be an encroachment of national sovereignty. However, since trade 
affects other areas of international law grater coherence is necessary.      
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
     Since its creation in 1994, the World Trade Organization has captured the attention not only 
of groups related to trade and economy but also of environmental groups, labor unions, human 
rights activists, and press people, among others. However this organization has been as much 
applauded as criticized. Many have blamed the WTO of no respecting other areas of 
international law, such as environmental regulation and the development of labor rights. 
Although we are firmly in favor of the necessity of greater coherence, this paper intends to 
analyze the disadvantages of incorporating rules belonging to other fields of international law 
into the international trading system, such us the so-called social clause. 
     Thus Chapter II explores the history and the nature of the WTO, whose objectives show that it 
was conceived as an economic organization, in which members assume commitments and grant 
concessions for the purpose of attaining development and economic growth. In our opinion, it 
would be illegitimate to overcharge the members with obligations totally contradictory to those 
that led them to their incorporation. 
     Chapter III analyzes the current position of the World Trade Organization with respect to the 
labor and environmental regimes. Also this section underlines the steps that members have taken 
within the trading system in order to achieve grater congruence with other areas of law. 
Meanwhile, Chapter IV deals with the potential implications of enlarging the mandate of the 
WTO as to regulate non-trade issues. This section also discusses some widely recognized reasons 
for which the addition of minimum standards for the protection of the environment or labor 
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rights could be dangerous and be perceived as an encroachment of national sovereignty. Finally, 
Chapter V presents other alternatives for making international trade more sensible  to 
environmental and social goals without resorting to the application of trade sanctions. 
     Chapter VI analizes the reasons for including minimum standards for the protection of 
intellectual property rights within the world trade arena. In addition, this section examines the 
gaps and impacts of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on 
developing countries. 
     The paper concludes that there are other less questionable means for procuring reconciliation 
between international trade objectives and the goals of international law in other fields than 
broadening and forcing the original objectives of the World Trade Organization. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY, NATURE, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE WORLD TRADE 
ORGANIZATION 
     Seeking to prevent catastrophic events, such us the World War II, and bearing in mind the 
decisive role the uncontrolled trade protectionism played in causing the above mentioned war,1 a 
group of countries sought to create an international organization pledged to furthering economic 
development and prevent the introduction of restrictive measures among themselves2.  
     The International Trade Organization (ITO) was conceived, in conjunction with the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as a multinational organization that would regulate 
national practices affecting international trade. Until then, history had not been so kind to the 
method of bilateral treaties for regulating trade between states and the new multilateral trade 
arrangements promised to be a better solution in order to get stability and world peace.3          
     In 1946, a Preparatory Committee was set up under the auspices of the United Nations 
Economic and Social Council4, with the purpose of drafting a charter for ITO. Simultaneously, 
negotiations on different tariff concessions and free trade principles were taking place between 
country-supporters of the ITO. Thus, in 1947 the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
                                                 
1 For a comprehensive analysis of the history of the World Trade Organization [WTO] see John H. Jackson & 
William J. Davey, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations 293 (3d ed. 2000).   
2 An anatomy of the World Trade Organization 1 (Konstantinos Adamantopoulos ed., 1997).  
3 See Dr. Melaku Geboye Desta, The Law of International Trade in Agricultural Products: From GATT 1947 to the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture 4 (2002).  
4 United Nations Economic and Social Council (hereinafter ESCOR). 
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[GATT],5 one of the most important multilateral treaties for commerce, was signed in Geneva by 
23 countries.6 
     In the meantime, the draft charter of the ITO was completed and opened for signatures at 
Havana, Cuba in 1948. But the Havana Chapter would never enter into force due to the 
withdrawal of support from the United States, whose first initiatives were directed towards the 
development of an international trade organization.7 This fact left the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade as the central, albeit somewhat handicapped, device for trade negotiations at 
the international level.  
     The GATT was never conceived as an organization. Instead, its major purpose was to put into 
effect the commercial policy provisions of the ITO, an organization that would provide the 
institutional framework for the conduct of trade relations.8 The General Agreement, intended to 
be in force just temporarily, would give contractual force to the negotiated tariff concessions and 
carry into effect the already initiated process of trade liberalization. It would act additionally as a 
bridging agreement between the former international economic order and the new rules-based 
system.9    
     Having been derived from Chapter IV of the Havana Chapter, the GATT would have been  
easily incorporated into the legal framework of the ITO; however, the ITO was never 
established. Different tensions between the United States and United Kingdom regarding the 
content of the charter, the Cold War, and an increasing socialism spread in Western Europe 
marked its fated history.10  
                                                 
5 See, generally, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade [GATT] Oct. 30, 1947, TIAS No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 
188.  
6 See, Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, supra note 2, at 1. 
7 See, John H. Jackson, supra  note 1, at 295. 
8 See, Konstantinos Adamantopoulos, supra  note 2, at 2. 
9 See, Rorden Wilkinson, Multilateralism and the World Trade Organization, 17 (2000). 
10  Id. at 16. 
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     The different states had reached a consensus on the necessity for an international commercial 
policy and the establishment of a permanent body to administer the rules promoting non-
discrimination. The ITO would not only have legal authority to interpret the multilaterally agreed 
rules but also to provide a mechanism for settling disputes. Nonetheless, despite the efforts, the 
United Kingdom struggled to incorporate clauses promoting full employment, whereas the 
United States remained reluctant to place the manage of domestic employment policies in the 
hands of an international body and focused its attention on the issue of tariff reduction.11  
     After the World War II, the enthusiasm decayed and the tendency of the United States 
Congress shifted to a less liberal attitude on trade matters.12 For its part, the United Kingdom was 
undergoing an increasingly difficult economic situation, lowering its support for the ITO. In 
addition, the bad experience of the League of Nations, for which creation the United States put 
forth much effort but never joined, discouraged the other participants from ratifying the ITO 
charter.13  
     Given the circumstances, the GATT would act, by default, as an independent legal body and 
as the ill-adapted organization where the members would coordinate national policies affecting 
international trade.14 The original three-year plan of GATT life was extended once it was clear 
that the ITO project was likely to fail.15 
     The success of the GATT survival was due to a general perception of the participants, who 
saw it as a less constraining agreement. In contrast to the ITO charter, the GATT did not 
                                                 
11 Id. As Roden Wilkison asserts the disagreements between the UK and US were reflected in the final charter , 
making it a contradictory document. Later, they proved irreconcilable as each sought to incorporate almost 
literally their favorite economic doctrines. Finally, the economic climate became markedly different from that 
envisaged by the wartime planners in addition to serious concerns about the content of the charter led to the US 
to refuse its ratification.      
12 John H Jackson, supra note 1, at 295.  
13 Roden Wilkison, supra note 9, at 17-8.  
14 See John H. Jackson, supra note 1, at 295. 
15 Wilkison, supra note 9, at 20. 
  
6
formally commit its contracting parties to the maintenance of full employment. This made it 
more more acceptable for countries such as the United States, which saw their participation in 
the ITO as a threat to their sovereignty.16  
     Commentators, such as John H. Jackson, argued that GATT application was controversial, 
flawed and still provisional. Its rules were applied as a binding international treaty, although this 
treaty structure brought itself other new problems, such as the difficulty of the amendment 
process, its uncertain relationship to domestic laws, the lack of a unified dispute settlement 
procedure, questions of membership, and the ill-defined capacities of the contracting parties.17     
     The necessity    of an institutional framework that would administer the numerous rules and 
concessions made by the GATT contracting parties could no longer wait. A small organization 
was established to operate GATT. Thus, for the ninth session, a draft charter for an Organization 
for Trade Cooperation was completed, though this charter met the same opposition and destiny 
as the ITO charter.18  
     Despite the GATT limitations there was not single motion during the 1980’s until 1990, when 
the Canadian Government put forth a formal proposal. However, the negotiators did not reach an 
agreement until December 1993. In 1994, the charter proposal of the World Trade Organization 
was submitted for ratification.19 Hence, the outcome of the eight-year old trade negotiations 
brought profound reform in the legal structures of the world trading system: the creation of the 
                                                 
16 The US refusal, followed by other states, to the ITO ratification; due primarily to the content of its charter, shows 
clearly the extent to which the majority of the countries were willing to sacrifice part of their sovereignty for 
their economic development. They saw this organization as part of a multilaterally agreed upon trade system in 
which ITO would play the main role and work in cooperation with the Bretton Woods institutions, the IMF and 
the World Bank. This point of view emphasizes the basically economic nature of the ITO since its origins as the 
WTO immediate predecessor. See Wilkinson, supra note 9 at 20-1.      
17 John H. Jackson, supra  note 1, at 296. 
18 Id. 
19 Id at 301. 
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World Trade Organization. This acomplishment marked the establishment of a well-defined 
institutional base for international trade. 
     In contrast to the ITO Charter, the charter of the WTO does not contain substantive rules but, 
instead, institutional measures. Rules concerning international economic behavior have been 
incorporated in four annexes, making the system flexible enough since different texts can be 
added or removed over time in agreement with the evolution of institutions and policies.20  
     Contrary to the General Agreement, the WTO constitutes an international organization with 
legal personality. It is provided with privileges, immunities, and the ability to develop relations 
with other subjects of international law.21 Thus, the original signatories of GATT’s so-called 
contracting parties became members of an organization, which additionally provides a 
mechanism for accession of new nations.22   
     Although unsuccessful, the ITO was intended to be one of the three organizations conceived 
during the Second World War with the purpose of coherently conducting the global economy. 
This attempt was part of a post-First-World-War culture of organization building directed 
towards the creation of a series of international organizations to manage key aspects of global 
life.23 Similarly, the WTO does not elude this practice. It represents the culmination, though not 
the end, of a political process stretching back to the wartime negotiations seeking to provide an 
organizational focal point for a liberal trade regime.24     
     True to its objectives, the World Trade Organization not only has directed the world’s 
attention towards other fields of economic activity enlarging the trade regime beyond a 
                                                 
20 Id, at 302. 
21 Id, at 303. 
22 Due to the fact that the GATT was not an organization, its participating nations or customs territories were called 
contracting parties and not members. See Id at 306.  
23 See Wilkinson, supra  note 9, at 2. 
24 Id. 
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traditional focus on trade in goods to include trade in services. But it also has, with the exception 
of labor, moved into the regulation of trade-related aspects, such as intellectual property rights 
and investment measures.25 
     In sum, the main functions thrust upon the WTO are to administer the Multilateral and 
Plurilateral Trade Agreements, included in its legal structure, and to further their principal 
objective, “to liberalize trade”.26 The failure of the WTO’s predecessors was due essentially, as 
pointed out above, to the fears of its original supporters, who thought that the rules incorporated 
in their charters and their participation on such powerful organizations would mean, in one form 
or another, the excessive constraint of their domestic sovereignty.27  
     The path towards the origin of the World Trade Organization was not free of drawbacks, but 
the indispensable necessity of such an organization and all its implications for achieving 
developmental goals made its establishment possible. To borrow the words of professor Hans 
Van Ginkel, conducting world trade according to multilaterally agreed rules has been a major 
contributor not only to the enormous expansion of the world economy over the half-century but 
also to the avoidance of international conflict.28  
     The original participants of GATT and supporters of the creation of the ITO knew about its 
benefits. Nevertheless, they did not want to compromise their sovereignty more than they 
deemed strictly necessary for achieving purely economic objectives. Indeed, the reason for which 
the WTO Charter was ratified was its flexibility, or an elasticity that did not jeopardize the 
member states’ right to regulate and implement their own policies on domestic issues. Thus, any 
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 Konstantinos Adamantopolus, supra  note 2, at 30.   
27 See Michael J. Trebilcock & Robert Howse, The Regulation of International Trade, 21 (2d ed.    1999).   
28 See Hans Van Ginkel, Preface to the first edition of Gary P. Sampson, The Role of the World Trade Organization 
in Global Governance (2001). 
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change of the current trading system should not alter both the many strengths of the system or 
the original will of its participants in order to respond to legitimate concerns.  
     Nowadays, there is a general consensus that the World Trade Organization is only one part of 
a system of global governance.29 Nonetheless the new challenging tasks, such as the 
humanization of the globalization process, call for greater coherence on policy making at the 
international as much as the national level.   
 
                                                 
29 See, Gary P. Sampson, supra note 27 at 15. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE CURRENT WTO POLICIES ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND LABOR MATTERS 
3.1 Trade and Environment 
     The issue of the relationship between international trade and environmental protection was 
almost overlooked in the world trade arena during its early periods.30 In 1971 a working Group 
on Environmental Measures and International Trade was established but its labor on the matter 
left much to be desired.31 The following are some of the responses of the multilateral trading 
system to the necessity to conciliate two values “Trade and Environment”, requirement 
indispensable to the world sustainable development.      
3.1.1 The Committee on Trade and Environment  
     On April 14, 1994 after the Tuna/Dolphin I case,32 which attracted the world attention and the 
awareness of the free trade impacts on the environment, the GATT contracting parties 
established the Committee on Trade and Environment.33 
     The committee’s principal tasks consist in identifying the relationship between trade and 
environmental measures for promoting sustainable development and making appropriate 
recommendations on whether modifications of the multilateral trade provisions are needed, as 
                                                 
30 See Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade and Protection of the Environment: The Continuing Search for 
Reconciliation, [91 A.J.I.L. 268] 268 (1997). 
31 Even though the GATT Council established the above-mentioned Working Group, it did not even meet for over 
twenty years. The real changes had to wait until the Tuna/Dolphin I case decision. See Id.   
32 See GATT Dispute Panel Report: United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 30 I.L.M. 1594 (1991), 
[hereinafter Tuna/Dolphin I] 
33 Committee on Trade and Environment [hereinafter CTE]. 
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long as, these changes are compatible with the open, equitable and non-discriminatory nature of 
the system.34  
     Even though the CTE acts for the protection of the environment, it is not an organization 
created towards that aim. In other words, the committee’s task should not exceed the competence 
of the multilateral trading system, which is limited to trade policies and trade-related aspects of 
environmental policies that may result in significant trade effects.35  
      In accordance with the Marrakesh decision, the CTE should address the following items36:      
• The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade 
measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral 
environmental agreements. 
• The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental 
measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading 
system. 
• The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and: 
a. Charges and taxes for environmental purposes.  
b. Requirements for environmental purposes related to products, including standards 
and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling. 
• The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade 
measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements 
which have significant trade effects. 
                                                 
34 See Hakan Nordstrom & Scott Vaughan, Special studies 4 Trade and Environment, 72 (2000). 
35The World Trade Organization and its Committee on Trade and Environment, available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/issu1_e.htm.   
36 Hakan Nordstrom and Scott Vaughan, supra note 34 at 72-3. 
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• The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading 
system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements. 
• The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to 
developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and environmental 
benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions. 
• The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods. 
• The relevant provisions of the agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights. 
• Services and appropriate arrangements for relations with non-governmental organizations 
referred to in Article V of the WTO and transparency of documentation.      
     Unfortunately, the progress on satisfactorily addressing these matters has been much too 
slow.37 The CTE has undergone serious difficulties in coming to a decision due to the 
exceedingly slow decision-making process of the WTO and its organs. This factor hinders the 
possibility of formulating concrete recommendations for reconciling free trade and 
environmental protection.  
     In Singapore, the CTE Report was adopted with the understanding that it would not modify 
the rights and obligations of any of the WTO members under the WTO Agreements. This 
condition was created to make it possible for a number of delegations to join the consensus and 
approve the report.38 
     The Increasing number of WTO members evidences the need to speed up the WTO decision-
making process, perhaps, as Thomas Schoenbaum suggests, through the adoption of an executive 
                                                 
37 As noted by Thomas J. Schoenbaum, the report, drawn up by the CTE to the Singapore Ministerial Conference 
held in December 1996, shows very little analysis and evaluation and virtually no recommendations for specific 
actions. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 269. 
38 Report of the meetings held on 30 October and 6-8 November 1996, doc. WT/CTE/M/13 (22 November 1996). 
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committee structure that would be able to set deadlines for CTE recommendations. The same 
author asserts that even with that structure, the reconciliation of trade and environment questions 
could be illusory due to the complexity of issues involved and the multiplicity of viewpoints.39     
3.1.2 Environmental exceptions in the WTO Regulation 
     Unlike the general agreements of the WTO, which cover trade in almost all their areas, there 
is not an internationally agreed upon legal framework on environment. On that ground, thus far, 
global problems stemming from the relationship between trade and environment have to be 
analyzed in light of the WTO commercial regulation. This paper will examine the pertinent 
environment-related exceptions referred to by Article XX, sections “b” and “g” of the GATT.40 
Since 1982, there have been several actions brought before various GATT panels against 
trade-restricted measures justified on environmental grounds. These actions were invariably 
successful due to a traditional way of interpreting GATT Article XX.41 The exceedingly strict 
way to construe the general exceptions allowed the least possible departure from the basic 
principles of free trade.42 
However, the establishment of the WTO marked a period of significant changes in the 
interpretation of Article XX as well as in the refinement of WTO jurisprudence. Since 1994, the 
GATT nations recognized the World Trade Organization as the governing body for GATT and 
adopted a dispute settlement system to resolve international trade disputes. The new system has 
                                                 
39 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra note 29 at 270.  
40 GATT, supra note 4.  
41 Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of the Natural Environment: Recent 
Trends in the Interpretation of GATT Article XX (b) and (g), [10 Transnat’1 L. & Contemp. Probs. 271], 275 
(2000). 
42 Id, at 276. 
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provided a well-defined procedure ensuring more clarity, predictability and adherence to legal 
principles.43 
Under the free trade regime administered by the WTO, nations can bring complaints against 
members applying policies limiting imports or constraining commerce. Usually, complaints cite 
the non-discrimination principles embodied by Articles I and III of the GATT. Nonetheless, the 
trade regime exempts nations from their GATT obligations under certain circumstances through 
the general exceptions of Article XX. Two of these exceptions, paragraphs (b) and (g), are 
related to environmental concerns and read as follows: 
“...Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, 
nothing in this agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by 
any contracting party of measures: (b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or 
health; (g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such measures 
are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic production or 
consumption...” 
     As noted by Carrie Wofford, the introductory clause or chapeau of Article XX, qualifies all 
the exceptions in paragraphs (a) to (j), preventing the abuse of the rules available in Article XX. 
In other words, the chapeau allows discrimination on the ground of environmental protection, as 
long as it is not arbitrary, unjustifiable, or used as a cover for disguised restrictions on 
international trade.44 
                                                 
43 Carrie Wofford, A greener future at the WTO: The refinement of the WTO Jurisprudenceon Environmental 
Exceptions to GATT, [24 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 563], 567-68 (2000). 
44 Id. at 566. 
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On that ground, the party asserting the exception must show that it is legally applicable. This 
burden, however, has proven very difficult to surmount due to the strictness with which the 
previous panels used to interpret these provisions. For instance, in several cases the panels found 
that the measures did not qualify for an environmental exception because they were not 
consistent with GATT provisions. 
Nowadays, it has been recognized that an exception is, by definition, likely to be inconsistent 
with GATT obligations. The chapeau clearly cautions that nothing in the agreement shall be 
construed to prevent the adoption of such measures so long as they meet with determined 
conditions. 
Thus, the Appellate Body reversed the lower panel’s decision in the United States Gasoline 
Standards case. It criticized the panel finding, which had concluded that the U.S. baseline 
regulations had not satisfied the test of Article XX (g). The panel, in the Appellate Body’s 
opinion, did not give adequate consideration to the wording of the chapeau and determined that 
the U.S. baseline regulations met the requirements referred to by paragraph (g) for which the 
measure could be perfectly justified under this section. However, the measure was declared 
inconsistent with the non-discrimination portion of the chapeau.45  
Another notable shift, that opens the door to environmental concerns, is the Appellate Body’s 
more literal interpretation of Article XX. The Appellate Body has abandoned the rigid tests and 
requirements that previous panels had imposed on environmental policies seeking exception to 
GATT. 
In this line, the Appellate Body has rejected the theory that the word “necessary”, which 
qualified paragraph (b), implies that the policy seeking to be justified must be the least trade 
                                                 
45 See Gasoline Appellate Report: United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, 
WT/DS2/AB/R, AB-1996-1 (Apr. 29, 1996) 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996), at 23, 35 I.L.M. at 627. [Hereinafter Gasoline 
Appellate Report]. 
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restrictive among the measures reasonably available. Prior panels have commonly held this 
interpretation as such in the Thailand Cigarettes case when a ban on imported cigarettes was 
found unjustifiable under Article XX.46 
Another example took place in 1991 when a GATT panel invalidated a United States import 
ban on tuna caught in an unfriendly manner for dolphins. The measure demanded the use of a 
special device, which impeded dolphins from beiing casually captured, injured or killed.47 The 
panel used the least trade restrictive interpretation, asserting that the U.S. did not exhaust all the 
options reasonably available to pursue its environmental objectives with the least degree of 
inconsistency with its GATT obligations.48 Similarly, in Canada’s Landing Requirements for 
Salmon and Herring, the panel concluded that the Canadian government, in demanding that 
fishermen bring their catches to landing stations to be counted, was violating unnecessarily its 
GATT duties.49 
However, in 1996 the Appellate Body overturned the path followed in previous cases when in 
the United States Gasoline Standards case, it discarded the least restrictive requirement and 
rescued the true meaning of the introductory clause. Contrary to the previous cases, it interpreted 
the treaty provisions in accordance with its ordinary meaning in the light of its object and 
purpose according to the widely recognized Vienna Convention.50 Indeed, the Appellate Body 
                                                 
46 See, Thailand Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, November 7, 1990, GATTB.I.S.D. 
(37th Supp.) 200, para. 74 (1990), 30 ILM 1122 (1991).  
47 Tuna/Dolphin I, Supra note 32, para. 5.28. 
48 The panel considered that the United States could fulfill its dolphin protection objectives through other methods 
less restrictive such us the negotiation for international cooperation of the countries involved. Id. 
49 See In Re Canada’s Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring, 12 I.T.R.D. 1026, (Oct. 16, 1989), paras. 
7.15 - 7.18. [Hereinafter Salmon Panel Report]. 
50 Vienna Convention on the Law of the Treaties, opened for signature May 3, 1969, Article 31 (3), 1155 UNTS 
331. The Article reads as follows:  
“...In interpreting a treaty there shall be taken into account, together with the context: a) Any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions. 
b) Any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding  its interpretation. c) Any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties...”  
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asserted that the fundamental theme of the chapeau is to be found in the purpose and object of 
avoiding abuse or illegitimate use of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article 
XX.51 
Thomas J. Schoenbaum argues that the word “necessary” should not be taken as related to 
whether the measure is a necessary departure from the trade agreement. Contrary to that, this 
word should be construed as directed towards the protection of living things, which is the 
purpose and object of the measure.52 He also asserts that any other interpretation of “necessary” 
is an amendment of the wording of Article XX (b); otherwise, the least restrictive requirement 
would of been literally included in that paragraph or the chapeau.53 
In the United States Gasoline Standards case, the Appellate Body recognized that the United 
States had the legitimate right to choose a policy that lowered its costs and reduced its 
administrative difficulties rather than a less trade restrictive, but more expensive, measure. Thus, 
the U.S. gasoline standards could be legally imposed so long as the measure met the 
requirements set out in the chapeau.54 
Lastly, the least restrictive test, states Professor Schoenbaum, exceedingly limits the 
sovereign powers of states to take decisions to solve problems and satisfy their constituents. The 
standard of review in the chapeau mentioned above contrarily provides a more deferential test, 
allowing some freedom of action to member states.55 
In the same fashion of the least restrictive requirement, the lower panels imposed another 
harsh test on environmental policies seeking conformity with Article XX. This time the previous 
panels demanded that policies had to be “primarily aimed at” the conservation of natural 
                                                 
51 Carrie Wofford, supra note 43 at 576.  
52 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, supra note 30, at 276. 
53 Id.  
54 See Wofford, supra note 43 at 577. 
55 Schoenbaum, supra note 30 at 277. 
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resources. This interpretation meant that the measure would meet the test provided that it be 
adopted for conservation reasons alone.56 
In the Canada’s Landing Requirements for Salmon and Herring case, the panel used a cost-
benefit analysis. From its point of view, the benefits obtained from the landing requirement were 
disproportionate to the time and effort requested. Thus, once again the panel’s opinion seemed to 
be a departure from the rules of the Vienna Convention and an amendment to the wording of 
paragraph (g).57 
In the Tuna/Dolphin I case, the panel invalidated the measure applied by the United States on 
the ground that it constituted a restriction on trade relying on unforeseeable conditions. Despite 
the fact that a ban on the importation of tuna in a non-dolphin-safe way was obviously a measure 
related to conservation of such species and therefore met the “relate to” requirement, the panel 
badly misinterpreted the content of paragraph (g).58 
In the Tuna/Dolphin II case, it was said the measure was primarily aimed at controlling the 
trade behavior of others since the policy could not be effective in achieving its purpose if other 
countries did not change their tuna fishing practices.59 And in the United States Automobile 
Taxes case as well as in the United States Gasoline standards case, the reason argued, was that 
the less favorable treatment did not conserve the resources; consequently, the measure did not 
comply with the “relating to” test.60 
Nevertheless, in the latter case the Appellate Body took issue with the panel opinion, pointing 
out that the less favorable treatment was a consequence and not the measure at stake. The 
                                                 
56 Wofford, supra note 43 at 578. 
57 See Salmon Panel Report, supra note 50, para. 7.04. 
58 See Tuna/Dolphin I, supra note 32, [ para. 5.33, 30 I.L.M.] at 1621. 
59 GATT Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994) 
para. 5..27, 30 I.L.M. at 1620. [Hereinafter Tuna /Dolphin II]. 
60 See United States Taxes on Automobiles, 33 ILM 1937 (1994) paras. 5.60 - 5.61. 
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Apellatte Body argued that what really matters was whether the measure itself was related to the 
conservation.61 
The change in the treatment of this exception can also be noticed in the Shrimp/Turtle case.62 
In earlier cases, panels focused on side aspects rather than on the conservation issue, such as the 
aim of the measure, its area of application, and the manner in which it must be applied, among 
others.63 In contrast, in Shrimp/Turtle case the Appellate Body firmly took into account the 
language of paragraph (g) and examined the relationship between the measure seeking 
justification and the purpose of environmental protection, finding that the U.S. law was not 
disproportionately wide in scope or reach regarding the policy objective.64 
It is worthy to note that in Shrimp/Turtle as well as in the U.S. Gasoline Standards case, the 
Appellate Body followed a more environmental and coherent approach with other areas of 
international law. It observed that the WTO agreement was not to be read in clinical isolation 
from public international law. Thus, reference was made to CITES and to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea to establish the status of marine turtles.65 
Another step in the evolution of the Article XX interpretation is the meaning, pointed out by 
the Appellate Body, of the “in conjunction with” requirement. It was recognized that even 
though this element requires certain evenhandedness it does not demand identity of treatment. In 
other words, restrictions on domestic production or consumption are enough to satisfy the test set 
out in the text of paragraph (g). The impacts or effects of the measure applied externally do not 
have to be equal to those stemming from its internal application.66 This interpretation, as well as 
                                                 
61 Schoenbaum, supra note 30 at 278.  
62 See United States Import Prohibitions on Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Panel’s report May 15, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
832, Appellate Body’s Report Oct. 12, 1998, 38 I.L.M. 118 [hereinafter Shrimp/Turtle] 
63 See Lorenzo Schiano di Pepe, supra note 41, at 286.  
64 See Wofford, supra note 43 at 580.  
65 Schiano di Pepe, supra note 41 at 286. 
66 See Schoenbaum, supra note 29 at 279. 
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those described above, clearly lowers the hurdle that environmental policies must meet in 
seeking justification under Article XX 
     The extraterritorial application of Article XX constitutes another progressive step in the 
defense of the adoption of environmental measures. In the beginning, previous panels to 
Tuna/Dolphin II reached the conclusion that these exceptions were applicable only to natural 
resources and living things within the territory of the country invoking the provision. However, 
the Tuna/Dolphin II panel distinguished between the exercise of jurisdiction of the members and 
the extraterritorial application of Article XX (b) and (g). 
It is internationally recognized that states can extraterritorially exercise jurisdiction only with 
respect of their own nationals. A state can legitimately control the activities of its own citizens 
acting outside its territory, and the panel in Tuna/Dolphin II admitted this faculty. Thus, the 
panel ruled that the U.S. government could validly enforce an Article XX (g) restriction 
extraterritorially but only against their own nationals and vessels.67 
However, despite that limitation, it was also recognized that under international law, the 
states have an obligation to prevent damage to the environment even beyond the borders of 
national jurisdiction; therefore, according to this reasoning, Article XX would have 
extraterritorial but not extra-jurisdictional application. 
As noted by Schiano di Pepe, the depletion of a natural resource, especially of migratory 
animal species, is a global problem that cannot be solved by measures adopted on a national 
basis.68 But, what does this new approach do in response to environmental concerns? The 
recognition of certain domestic policies, described in paragraphs (a) through (j) as exceptions to 
substantive obligations established in GATT, notes the general acceptance of their importance 
                                                 
67 Tuna/Dolphin II, supra note 60, para. 5.20. 
68 See Schiano di Pepe, supra note 41 at 298. 
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and legitimacy. Consequently, unilateral measures requiring other WTO members to adopt 
certain policies as a condition for its market accession can no longer be deemed a priori 
unjustifiable. 
3.1.3 The Status of the Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
Nowadays, it is more common to resort to multilateral environmental agreements [MEAS] to 
solve environmental problems. An examination of this area is of relevant importance since some 
of these agreements contain provisions related to trade, which can potentially conflict with the 
WTO/GATT system. So far, there exist approximately 200 MEAS, of which 20 contain 
provisions that can affect trade.69 
Contrary to international trade agreements, which rarely address environmental matters, 
MEAS are more predisposed to contain measures involving trade restrictions. This happens due 
to the fact that the subjects of the MEAS tend to be internationally traded. As a result, certain 
regulations necessary to protect the environment are, under determined circumstances, 
indispensable.70 
Notwithstanding such a necessity, the creation or existence of an MEA involving trade-
related provisions implied a potential conflict with basic WTO rules. Not only could there be 
conflicts between the rights and obligations contained in an MEA and the WTO agreement, but 
there could also be conflicts of jurisdiction between two institutions or adjudicating bodies 
claiming the right to deal with a dispute with trade and environment dimensions.71 
Gabrielle Marceau suggests that certain widely accepted rules of international law can 
potentially solve the first kind of conflicts, while a conflict of jurisdiction seems to be settled by 
                                                 
69 The committee on Trade and Environment, the Trade Legislation, the MEAS and the differences, available at  
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/cte01_e.htm     
70 Schoenbaum, supra note 30 at 282.  
71 See Gabrielle Marceau, Conflicts of Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions-The relationship between the WTO 
Agreement and MEAs and  other Treaties, Journal of World Trade, December 2001 at 1082. 
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the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, which claims jurisdiction over all trade-related matters 
to the exclusion of other fora.72 
Lex posterior derogat priori and lex specialis derogat generali are two principles of 
international law which play a crucial role in solving conflicts between treaty provisions. The 
earlier is embodied in Article 30 of the Vienna Convention, while the latter, although not 
mentioned in this convention, has been recognized by the jurisprudence and the doctrine.73 
When two disputing states are parties to two treaties dealing with the same subject matter and 
there are not specific treaty provisions, an interpretation seeking a cumulative application of both 
treaties should be made. However, notwithstanding the possibility that both remain in force, by 
virtue of the principle of Lex posterior derogat priori, preference must be given to the provisions 
of the treaty that is later in time.74 On the other hand, when the dispute is between a state party to 
both treaties and a state party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both states are parties 
will govern their rights and obligations.75 
As Marceau describes, the rationale of the Lex specialis derogat generali principle is that 
when the rule-makers deal with a subject matter in specific terms they are implicitly expressing 
their will to set aside the general rule in favor of the specific one. Once again between parties of 
two treaties dealing with the same subject, unless the parties’ intention provides otherwise, both 
treaties should be simultaneously applied to the greatest extent possible, even if the specific 
provisions of one supersede the general rules of the other. On the contrary, when a third state that 
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is a party to just one of the treaties is involved, any suspension or abrogation can be made 
without respecting its rights and obligations embodied in the superseded treaty.76 
As should be noticed, it is more likely that problems arise between signatory countries of an 
MEA adopting measures that can affect rights and obligations of nonparties of the environmental 
treaty in question. A similar problem is caused by an MEA with extraterritorial application.77 In 
this regard, some commentators have proposed a solution through the amendment of Article XX. 
Professor Hudec, for instance, advocates the addition of a provision on MEAS within Article XX 
of the GATT. This new section would follow the example of Section (h) of the above mentioned 
article, creating an exception for trade measures imposed pursuant to obligations in 
environmental agreements.78 
In this way, Article XX (k) should also set out a method of approval. In the view of Professor 
Schoenbaum, for an MEA to satisfy the test of Article XX (k), it should meet the following 
requirements: (1) the agreement should be open to all parties having a legitimate interest in the 
environmental problem; (2) the restrictions adopted should be reasonably related to the problem 
addressed; and (3) the treaty should comply with the jurisdictional norms of international law.79 
3.2 Trade and Labor Law 
Regarding the law governing the treatment of workers, the WTO does not prescribe any 
obligation that WTO members have to fulfill. On the contrary, all of the members preserve their 
right to regulate labor practices and implement into their domestic law the policies and 
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conventions they deem necessary.80 In this context, Article XX, Section (e) becomes the sole 
provision related to labor and reads as follows: 
...Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguise restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting 
party of measures: 
(e) relating to the products of prison labor... 
In contrast to the ITO Charter, except for this provision, the articles of GATT did not deal 
with labor standards. Article 7 of the ITO stated, “The members recognize that unfair labor 
conditions, particularly in the production for export, create difficulties in international trade, and 
accordingly, each member shall take whatever action may be appropriate and feasible to 
eliminate such conditions within its territory. However, as mentioned earlier, the ITO never came 
into being.81 
Thus, steps to improve working conditions have been taken, so far, through the voluntary 
adoption of a series of conventions, most of them under the auspices of the ILO’s wide-ranging 
coverage of issues in the world of work.82 The success of the work of the International Labor 
Organization (ILO) relied largely on persuasion and the ratification and subsequent inclusion of 
labor standards into national legislation. Their compliance has been driven by ethical 
considerations. 
                                                 
80 Alice Enders, The Role of the WTO in Minimum Standards, Challenges to the New World Trade Organization, P. 
Van Dijck & G. Faber eds., 1996. 
81 T. N. Srinivasan International Trade and Labor Standards from an Economic Perspective, supra note 79, at 220. 
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author points out the fact that no explicit sanctions, particularly sanctions in the form of withdrawal of rights of 
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Nevertheless, free trade has always been considered a desirable objective. For many, it is not 
only compatible with social goals but can successfully collaborate with rising standards of living, 
including working conditions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ISSUE OF MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND LABOR RIGHTS 
 
     The reasons most commonly arguable in favor of the international unification of labor and 
environmental standards are: (1) the legitimate concerns for the conservation of the environment; 
(2) the humanitarian concern in industrialized countries about the poor working conditions or 
employment of children in developing countries; and (3) the deceptive idea that lower standards 
in a state, in comparison to its trading partners, confers on it an unfair competitive advantage. 
     Nonetheless, despite the good intentions of most of the supporters in enlarging the WTO 
mandate, the formal inclusion of environmental standards, or the so-called social clause, within 
the WTO scope entails a real danger that can unnecessarily risk the development of poor 
countries. This section critically analyzes the arguments in favor of establishing a link between 
labor or environmental standards and trade.  
     As Pitou Van Dijck and Gerrit Faber note, the inclusion of labor and environmental standards 
and their corresponding enforcement mechanisms in the WTO constitution is controversial, and 
its disputability can be summarized in four reasons. First, the universality of labor and 
environmental standards is questionable. Second, the efficiency and effectiveness of trade-related 
measures are doubtful. Third, standards and trade-related enforcement mechanisms affect 
international competitiveness and are capable of being abused for protectionist reasons. Fourth, 
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the logic of including standards, measures and enforcement mechanisms in WTO rules rather 
than other multilateral agreements is disputable.83 
4.1 The Universality of Labor and Environmental Standards 
     Regarding labor standards, the notion that they are based in human rights and, therefore, 
should be universally recognized is strongly criticized by many commentators.84 The demand for 
the incorporation of a social clause in the WTO regime based on an imprecise idea of 
universality of labor rights is not legitimate at all. Indeed, differences between countries are 
justified since there are culture-specific labor standards. 
     Professor Srinivasan highlights the fact that ILO has not yet reached a consensus among its 
constituents regarding the identification of a core group of labor rights that can work as 
minimum standards and be included in a social clause.85 Thus, it is not surprising that the 
enforcement of a set of core standards through the threat of trade sanctions on which there is no 
political consensus is perceived by developing countries as driven by protectionist motives.86    
     Similarly, in the environmental field, scholars such us Verbruggen and Kuik argue that 
principles of environmental policy should be universal but that standards may differ in 
determined cases.87 Thus, differential standards would be allowed to deal with local 
environmental problems, while harmonization of minimum protection levels would be required 
in order to deal with international environmental problems.88 
     However, the development of international environmental principles is fairly recent and may 
not always present binding obligations capable of resolving controversial disputes. One of the 
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challenges of the post-Uruguay era will be to develop these international environmental 
principles and integrate them in trade rules.89 This merging should be founded on the concept of 
sustainable development, an objective shared by the trade and environmental regimes, which can 
be found in the UN Conference on Environment and Development [Rio Declaration]90 as well as 
in the preamble of the agreement establishing the WTO.       
     The best alternative to making trade and environment regulation mutually supportive is the 
establishment of a set of international agreements on the basis of commonly agreed upon 
principles and norms which would guarantee the participation of the parties concerned, the 
implementation of the agreements and their enforcement.91 Once again, consensus is an 
indispensable requirement in order to avoid the negative perception of the trade measures as an 
illegal interference in the national sovereignty and a means to serve protectionist interests.   
4.2 Effectiveness of Trade-Related Measures 
     The second point questions the effectiveness of trade measures. Srinivasan, among other 
commentators, refers to trade sanctions as an indirect and sometimes ineffective means.92 He 
states that it is not inconceivable that a country threatened with trade measures for failure to raise 
its labor standards might not respond by raising them but instead choosing to forego gains from 
trade.93   
     Srinivassan argues that rather than introducing minimum labor standards in WTO trade rules, 
developed countries can resort to more effective and direct measures. For instance, these 
countries may liberalize their immigration policies, support abolishment or reduction of child 
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labor by means of income transfers to the parents of child workers, or making known their 
preferences on the market by refraining from consuming goods produced by unacceptable 
means.94   
     In the same vein, Wouter Tims declines the effectiveness of linking trade with enforcing labor 
standards. He asserts that trade measures with a focus on exports only against an exploitative 
country would have limited effects, inducing a change of technology or labor conditions in 
production earmarked for export and leaving the rest of the industry untouched.95  
     Studies carried out in India regarding child labor reveal that a large number of children are 
invisible workers who do unpaid work and who find no market outlet, such as work within the 
household. The number of children who are neither working nor going to school is many times 
larger than children who are working. Most of these children are girls who are looking after 
siblings.96 This confirms the hypothesis that trade sanctions are not the most adequate alternative 
for raising living or working standards and that their action is limited and one-dimencional.    
     Moreover, the sanctions that critics of the WTO system advocate not only are inefficient but 
also can harm developing-country workers, who ironically are rarely consulted about the 
application of those measures.97 Thus, the central point of the North-South debate is the 
developed country preference for unilateral trade restrictions against developing-country imports 
rather than a more efficient remedy, such as negotiated agreements involving financial and 
technical assistance.98  
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     The truth is that development and economic growth have long been the major contributors to 
rising living standards. This has led commentators, such as economist Paul Krugman, to assert: 
“[E]very successful example of economic development this past century - every case of a poor 
nation that worked its way up to a more or less decent, or at least dramatically better, standard of 
living - has taken place via globalization; that is, by producing for the world market”...99  
     In the same way, with respect to the environment, it is evident that trade sanctions can deal 
only with one part of the industry. Restricting measures would leave unscathed the sector where 
other producers in the same branch, who happen not to export, operate. Moreover it also permits 
other products, to be exported without punishment because the violations take place at an earlier 
stage in the production process. Thus the environmental objectives would be achieved to a 
marginal extend only.100 
     Thus, trade-positive measures have proved more effective than questionable trade restrictions; 
however the latter are more facile to approve than serious but more costly commitments, the 
Shrimp/Turtle case is a good example.101 The U.S. legislation imposing an import ban om shrimp 
products was easier to pass than financing serious environmental studies of the local sea turtle 
problems in developing countries because the ban satisfied the U.S. shrimp industry interests. 
Positive measures, the most effective way to address the environmental issue without negative 
consequences for developing-country industry, were laid aside.102 
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     To borrow the words of Gregory Shaffer, the result is developed country legislation that 
triggers controversial disputes brought before the WTO, ensuing challenges to WTO legitimacy, 
and “largely ineffective” environmental protection.103 
4.3 The danger of protectionist abuse      
     The third premise, which questions the future incorporation of minimum standards and trade-
related enforcement mechanisms is the high probabilities that imposition of sanctions is abused 
for protectionist reasons. This view is not strange considering the suspicious behavior of its 
principal supporters.  
     In 1999, a high and rising account deficit in the United States and persistent unemployment in 
the large European Union economies contributed to an anti-free bias and exacerbation of 
protectionist pressures. Over the years, the idea that trade with low-wage countries was 
depressing United States incomes attracted more supporters. The general opinion was that the 
United States must not trade with such countries. While in the European Union the idea of unjust 
foreign competition was the perfect excuse to disguise dysfunctional domestic policies that 
produced chronically high unemployment.104 
     The proposal to further empower the WTO by introducing new areas such as investment, 
competition, government procurement, and labor and environmental standards seems to be an 
insurmountable disagreement between developed and developing countries.105 In a context where 
the United States and the European Union insisted on linking trade with labor and environmental 
rights while tariff barriers on textiles, apparel, steel, dairy and agricultural products remained 
stubbornly high, standards were perceived as a new pretext for rich country protectionism.106  
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     The suspicion is strongly confirmed in the observation of the conduct of industrialized 
countries vis-à- vis the fulfillment of environmental or labor commitments. The United States 
has not only failed to pay US$1,700,000,000 in United Nations dues, it has successfully 
pressured the UN to reduce the amount of its allotment, even though it was based on a smaller 
contribution in terms of the United States per capita wealth than for any other developed 
country.107    
     Moreover, contrary to Seattle, there has been no mass protest against the United States’ 
refusal to take domestic measures to reduce its contribution to global warming. Ironically, the 
U.S. is responsible for over one third of all green house emissions. Another example is the 
willingness of developed countries to join multilateral efforts to solve environmental problems. 
Under pressure from U.S. pharmaceutical and petroleum interests, the United States refused to 
ratify the UN Convention on Bio-Diversity or the Kyoto Protocol on Global Warming.108  
     In the labor field, the United States, despite its position as a leading proponent of a social 
clause in the WTO, has vigorously opposed external scrutiny of its own human rights record 
through existing mechanisms. Given these inconsistencies between its claims and practice, 
developing countries are in a reasonable position as to argue that proposed standardization of 
labor rights is not more than an excuse to protect the jobs of American workers.109  
     Indeed, an empirical study carried out by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) found little evidence of a linkage between abuse of labor standards and 
the establishment of a competitive trade advantage. The survey found that any resulting 
economic benefits were minor and short-lived. Moreover, respect for, or denial of, core labor 
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standards has never been an important determinant of investment decisions by foreign 
investors.110 
     Serious violations of core labor rights really occur because the systems of sub-contracting and 
out-sourcing, by which many multinational companies organize their production, are associated 
with human rights abuses. According to Kearney, retailers are paying such low prices that the 
supplying companies are forced to exploit their workforce, pay low wages, insist on long 
working hours and often include the employment of children. Child labor has everything to do 
with the European and United States multinational companies, merchandisers, and retailers. They 
are as guilty, if not more guilty, than local employers who beat, abuse and enslave children as 
young as four years old.111  
     Given this dichotomy, the fierce opposition of developing countries before any attempt for 
linking labor or environmental standards to trade, to the extent of rejecting even the 
incorporation of the issue in the WTO agenda cannot be unexpected. The point of view of these 
countries can be well expressed by opinions as radical as that of the Malaysian government, 
when its delegate stated that the WTO’s position on a social clause was “[N]o way, no 
discussions, no continuing work.”112    
4.4 Disputability of the Legitimacy of the Role of the WTO in Setting and Enforcing Standards 
     The last point is the disputability of the logic of including standards, measures and 
enforcement mechanisms in WTO rules rather than other multilateral agreements or specialized 
agencies. Until recently, the WTO did not give an explicit mandate either with respect to labor 
standards and social development nor to environmental standards. Article XX comprises general 
exceptions to WTO’s rules and principles under special circumstances but does not determine the 
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role that the WTO should play in these areas. Due to that fact, commentators such as Pitou Van 
Dijck have argued that the WTO should not itself be involved in standard setting.113 
     Srinivasan, among others, maintains that the consensus through specialized agencies such as 
ILO should be pursued in setting standards. However, the functions of the existing multilateral 
institutions need to be clearly defined, and policy-making at both the national and international 
levels calls for greater coherence.114     
     Those who see merit in addressing non-trade issues, such as human rights labor standards, 
and environmental protection in existing institutions other than the WTO, propose that the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies be strengthened and provided with the necessary 
resources to carry out their tasks successfully.115 In their view the expanding missions of the 
international economic organizations are resulting in the centralization of power and resources in 
the WTO, the World Bank and the International Monetary Found in detriment of other 
specialized institutions and the United Nations system as a whole.116  
      This opinion is founded upon different studies which have provided evidence of the adverse 
results developing nations have experienced as a result of overlapping functions exercised by 
economic institutions. Those affected countries are the consumers of these organizations’ 
services.117   
      
                                                 
113 Van Dijck & Faber, in supra note 84 at 326. 
114 Gary p. Sampson, supra note 29 at 15. 
115 Id. 
116 See Daniel D. Bradlow, Global Trade Issues in the New Millenium: Some Preliminary Thoughts on Developing 
Countries, NGOS and the Reform of the WTO, [33 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 503] 532 (2001).  
117 Bradlow highlights the result of a series of studies that provide evidence that the involvement of economic 
organizations such as the WTO in more issues is very troubling to the developing countries. Thus, the United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights revealed the difficulties the Uruguay Round of negotiations caused for 
the developing countries. The recent external evaluations of IMF surveillance and its old Enhanced Structural 
Adjustment Facility (actually the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility) criticized the rigidity the IMF shows 
in its negotiations with those member states that use its services. Moreover, a recent press report revealed the 
disastrous policies for the cashew industry that the Bank was able to impose on Mozambique. See Id. 
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CHAPTER 5 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS WITHIN THE WTO SCOPE: A GOOD OR 
BAD EXAMPLE FOR ENLARGING THE WTO MANDATE 
5.1 Reasons for the IPRs Incorporation within the WTO System 
     On repeated occasion, the critics of the trading system have asserted that the WTO’s 
treatment of intellectual property rights should be emulated with environmental or social 
purposes. This critizism is due to the fact that the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) mandates harmonized recognition and enforcement of 
patents, copyright and other intellectual property rights.118  
     Indeed, by virtue of the TRIPS Agreement, a WTO member may impose import restrictions 
on products and services entirely unrelated to the violated property right in question. All this has 
led to social activists and environmental groups to argue that there is no valid reason why the 
WTO should not enforce core labor standards and environmental norms if it can protect 
Madonna’s, Puff Daddy’s, and Eli Lillys’s royalties.119 
     The starting point of this analysis is the concept of intellectual property [IP] itself. IP can be 
defined as creations of the human mind, these creations translated into inventive works such as 
books, paintings, and inventions, including designs and trademarks. Contrary to the nature of 
labor rights or environmentally inspired rules, IP rules are susceptible to trade and exploitation in 
order to obtain economic gains. In other words they are objects of commerce.  
                                                 
118 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 33 I.L.M. 1197, in General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round, April 
15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1125, Annex 1C [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].   
119 Gregory Shaffer, supra note 98 at 622-23. 
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     Intellectual property rights [IPRS] then are legal rights governing the use of such creations. 
There is a wide array of rights, such as patents, trade-marks or copyrights, with a different 
purpose and effect; however, as a general rule, all of them exclude third parties from exploiting 
protected subject matter, without explicit authorization of the right holder, for a determined time 
period.120 This allows IPRS owners to exploit their creations without fear of losing control over 
their use which, in turn, would presumably help in their dissemination. 
     The exploitative potential of these creations has produced a big change in the developed 
countries’ economies. These changes has been experienced by the economy of the United States, 
where, in the early 1980’s, began a gradual but fundamental transformation from a 
manufacturing to an information-based economy.121 As a result, the need for a set of rules which 
govern the new trade in information goods while encompassing the protection of new 
technologies became indispensable.122 
     The problems occur because domestic legislation is addressed towards the pursuance of a 
balance between the economic interest of the IP right holders and the public interest in having 
access to new knowledge, while the TRIPS Agreement is focused on the capture of economic 
gains from the exploitation of Intellectual property. This inconsistency benefits developed 
countries, which are technology exporters, while developing countries remain in the periphery, 
bearing the burden of new and costly obligations in exchange of nothing.123  
     Thus, developing countries on the cusp of development, such as Brazil and India, whose 
markets represent a wide range of possibilities to foreign investors and increasing levels of 
                                                 
120 See Jayashree Watal, Intellectual Property Rights in the WTO and Developing Countries, 1 (2001). 
121 Ruth L. Gana, Prospects for Developing Countries Under the TRIPS Agreement, [29 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 735] 
741 (1996).  
122 According to Gana, the TRIPS agreement is all about a reorganization driven by the Western Hemisphere to re-
order the basis of economic relationships in order to make it responsive to trade in information goods. She argues 
that the ease with which these goods are duplicated necessitated a restructuring of rules, which govern 
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technology, have become, according to Ruth L. Gana decisive factors for the merging of trade 
and intellectual property rights.124  
5.2 Gaps in the WTO Regime for IPRs Protection: Does the System Work for Everybody? 
     The intellectual property rights system has been largely unable to recognize or value non-
western forms of knowledge generation like those of the existing indigenous and local 
communities. This knowledge is unsuitable with the dominant culture’s concept of “scientific” 
and so remains unprotected and free to outside appropriation.125   
     This problem occurs because conditions for protection are also based on culturally determined 
definitions that respond to developed countries’ economic interests. Moreover, terminology and 
concepts embodied in IPRS legislation favor the appropriation of local knowledge. Definitions of 
what is wild as opposed to cultivated, what is knowledge, who can posses it, and what can be 
considered innovations or inventions are exclusively directed to the protection of western forms 
of knowledge, ignoring the interests of local communities whose knowledge, resources and 
informal system of knowledge-transmission cannot satisfy the foreign requirements. Therefore, 
traditional knowledge is confined to the field of public domain.126     
     The area of traditional medicine is a prime example of this problem. Common remedies used 
today were first developed by healers before there was any contact with industrial societies.127 
For example, the most effective treatment for post-therapeutic neuralgia is hot pepper utilized as 
a component of modern pain relievers. It was discovered after scientists observed its use by 
South American indigenous tribes. Pilocarpine, used to treat glaucoma, was first used by 
                                                 
124 Id at 740-41. 
125 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Appropriation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local 
Communities, [17 Mich. J. Int’l L. 919] 920 (1996).  
126 Id at 921. 
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indigenous peoples in Brazil. And D-tubocurarine, a skeletal muscle relaxant used in 
anesthesiology, was derived from a concoction of arrow poison used by Amazonian Indians.128     
     The question that arises is whether a developing country’s court can refuse to grant a patent 
for a particular drug based on its lack of originality if native healers have been using its 
component in more rudimentary forms. And even more important, can a developing country 
patentee attempt to patent traditional medicine in a developed country? The obstacles would 
likely be impossible to overcome since industrialized nations usually treat traditional medicine or 
native knowledge as a product of nature and, therefore do not satisfy novelty requirements.129  
     Another inconvenience for native communities in the path towards the recognition of their IP 
rights is the fact that the system recognizes IPRS only as private rights on an individual basis. 
Collective rights belonging to a community are unsuitable under this conception.130 Moreover, 
traditional knowledge is transmitted from one generation to another. This method does not meet 
the novelty requirement that patent law demands.131 
     The condition of non-obviousness, which requires that an invention not be merely the next 
logical step after prior knowledge, also deprives the indigenous communities’ inventions or 
discoveries of the necessary characteristics for their patentability. For instance, the prior 
knowledge of a plant’s effect would invalidate any unprocessed indigenous use of the plant.132 
Roht Arriaza notes the irrelevance for indigenous people of showing unexpectedly improved 
properties, taking into account that local community’s discoveries, products and innovations are 
largely used for local consumption, which responds to their concrete necessities. 
                                                 
128 Ruth L. Gana, supra note 122 at 751-52.  
129 Id 749-50. 
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131 See Id. 
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     Patent law, in addition, requires that the subject matter of a patent is not the discovery of 
some natural phenomenon or a product of nature. This impedes the possibility of patenting a 
medicinal plant. However, if in using the same plant a scientist isolates the active substance, the 
product obtained becomes patentable. The knowledge of the substance properties may have been 
widely known by indigenous communities, but the IP system recognizes neither the discovery of 
the beneficial uses nor the efforts involved in selecting and preserving the same genetic 
qualities.133          
     The purposes driving the inventiveness and knowledge-seeking of indigenous people give rise 
to another dissociation with respect to the IP system. The TRIPS Agreement, the nuclear set of 
IP rules, makes it evident that the western view of the aims of intellectual investigation bows to 
economic motives. From the TRIPS perspective, an inventor produces in order to trade the 
product of her/his invention. To the contrary, inventions of local communities are produced 
mainly to satisfy their needs. This does not fit within the TRIPS logic.134       
5.3 Impacts of the TRIPS Agreement on Developing Countries 
5.3.1 On Development and Technology Access 
     The role that intellectual property rights has played in development with respect to the third 
world has been so indecisive that some commentators, such as Penrose, have asserted the view 
that third-world countries should be exempt from any international patent arrangement. Afterall, 
they argue, foreign patents tend more to restrict than to advance their industrial technique. 
Furthermore, there is the desirability of encouraging the development of these countries.135    
                                                 
133 Id at 938-39. 
134 The very name of TRIPS, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, indicates its application to 
goods potentially involved in international trade, excluding those created for local or national consumption. See 
Id. at 939-40.  
135 Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, [1987 Duke L.J. 
831] 842 (1987).  
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     IPRS are supposedly granted as a means of fostering the production of inventions that in turn 
promote society’s development. The rights concession is a reward granted to the patentee in 
exchange for a developmental benefit associated with his/her particular invention. The patent 
system, for instance, is designed to induce such inventions that otherwise would not be available. 
     In this way, the right holder is the only one capable of exploiting the patented invention, 
precluding domestic competition. Thus, local enterprises cannot sell the invention within their 
home country, compete in the export market or even import from countries where the invention 
may be legally produced.136        
     However, at least for developing countries, the concession of IPRS, in particular for patents, 
does not necessarily lead to development. In contrast to what happens in developed societies, the 
majority of patents granted by developing countries are conferred to foreigners. Explanation can 
be found in the fact that inventions are induced by domestic patent systems of countries with 
significant markets. It is not surprising, then, that the primary markets of the patent owners are in 
the markets of developed countries.137      
     There are very few inventions made by foreign enterprises in developing countries on the 
grounds of the existence of a patent system. Therefore, the most effective way for a developing 
country to obtain benefits from inventions is to be free of any restraints.138 The case of 
Tagament, an ulcer-treating medication, illustrates this assertion. SmithKline-Beckman alleged 
having lost one-half of the market, or a loss of $50 million in revenue, due to an Argentinian 
patent law that excluded pharmaceuticals from patent protection. A generic producer in that 
country duplicated the unpatented compound and put it in the market competing with Tagamet. 
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This benefited the development of local enterprises and facilitated resource retention and 
consumer savings in Argentina.139 
     In sum, it is clear that by protecting non-patent induced inventions, particularly foreign 
inventions, developing countries neither would attain major benefits nor could assure more 
development. On the contrary, since a patent holder can utilize the period of monopoly 
restriction to prevent competition, create dependencies, or make windfall profits at the right 
moment, such protection can have serious consequences hindering the realization of the rights to 
health, food, education, and access to information, among others.140 
     Indeed, the TRIPS stipulation that patent protection should cover both imported products as 
well as those manufactured locally has allowed patent owners to reach the conclusion that there 
is no need to work on the patented product within the country granting the right. Thus, the 
company that controls the patent can export the finished product rather than transfer technology 
or make direct foreign investments in that country.141 
     A WTO dispute between the United States and Brazil, with Brazil seeking to incorporate a so-
called local working clause in its national legislation, can better illustrate the issue in question. 
The Brazilian government wanted to impose the requirement that a product had to be produced 
locally as a precondition to granting a patent. This requirement was in line with its country’s  
necessity to accede to the new technologies. In the end, the dispute was withdrawn but the issue 
was left unresolved without any authoritative interpretation and with the constant danger of 
possible U.S. recourse to the WTO for the enforcement of the TRIPS.142  
                                                 
139 See Id. at 845-46. 
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     In other words, different realities make developing countries extremely sensible to the 
consequences of unlimited IPRS protection. A balance between private and public competing 
interests must be urgently sought. Oloka-Onyango and Deepika Udagama refer to this issue, 
pointing out that in contrast to the rest of the Uruguay Round’s agenda, negotiations over TRIPS 
ironically were not about freeing trade. Rather, they were about more protection and tighter 
control. The concentration of ownership of IPRS in developed countries and powerful non-state 
actors, has made the prevailing definitions of IPRS take more account of the interests of the 
producers of knowledge than they do the users.143 
5.3.2 On the Realization of the Right to Health  
     Distinct actors of international law, in particular the World Trade Organization, have 
manifested their concerns about the catastrophic consequences that can take place in a health 
market in which the motive of profit is paramount, especially in poor countries.144 The United 
Nations Commission on Human Rights recognized in the resolution 2000/7 that the TRIPS 
Agreement could severely affect the enjoyment of the right to health in particular through its 
effect on access to pharmaceuticals.145 
     While the IP legislation has been designed to act as an incentive for the innovation of new and 
more effective medicines, in practice, the strict implementation of increased standards for 
intellectual property rights protection may not necessarily improve the observance of the right to 
health. Indeed, if protection purely serves to the materialization of the interests of those who 
control the market instead of broader social goals, IPRS can provide a basis for increased cost of 
medicines, hospitals and other forms of health care. 
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     IPRS can be abused in a manner that can prevent the distribution of new medicines helpful to 
poor countries whose population cannot afford the prices charged by patent owners.146 Moreover, 
the fact that right holders can obtain major benefits in countries with strong markets has led 
pharmaceuticals and researchers to deviate their attention away from the so-called “unprofitable 
diseases.” For instance, between 1975 and 1996 only 11 of the 1,223 new chemical entities in the 
market were for the treatment of tropical diseases. Afflictions that predominantly affect poor 
countries’ populations, especially tuberculosis and malaria, still remain relatively under-
researched.147 
     The situation can get worse considering the pressure that is being exerted in bilateral contexts 
to force developing countries to undertake major obligations other than those stipulated in 
TRIPS. This has become known as “TRIPS plus,” which comprises everything from efforts to 
extend patent life beyond the 20-year minimum to attempts to limit the use of exceptions such 
compulsory licensing in ways not required by TRIPS.148  
     Thus, many developing and less developed countries have resorted to mechanisms such as 
parallel importation or compulsory licensing to face the aforementioned inconveniences. The 
former allows for improving access to cheaper drugs by importing the products legally marketed 
in another country at a cheaper price, irrespective of the consent of the patent holder. Meanwhile, 
the latter encourages the local production of generic substitutes by issuing a non-exclusive 
license to a third party produce similar compounds of a patented drug. This authorization is 
granted by a government authority regardless of the approbation of the patent owner and before 
the patent expires.    
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     However, despite the fact that these mechanisms are generally granted on the ground of the 
public interest or in cases of national emergency, they could eventually be considered as more 
restrictive than the TRIPS Agreement allows. Their utilization by developing countries increases 
the possibilities of being challenged before the WTO.   
     The UNDP Human Development Report shows how the generic production can help 
developing countries’ populations to gain access to treatments. In India, Flucanazole, a costly 
drug used in the HIV treatment, is generically produced at a price of $55 for 150 milligrams, a 
price much too reasonable in comparison with $697 in Malaysia, $703 in Indonesia and $817 in 
the Philippines.149 Likewise, a report of the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
noted that the AZT treatment is produced at $239 in the United States while the price of the 
generic is $48 in India.150          
     Only a fraction of the affected people, approximately 400,000, who live mainly in Europe and 
North America have access to patented anti-retroviral therapy. For the great majority of these 
people, the production and distribution of generic to a more affordable price is a question of life 
or death.151     
     The TRIPS Agreement embraces a public health protection provision through which members 
may exclude from patentability determined inventions necessary to protect public order or 
morality, including human, animal or plant life or health. Under this provision a country may 
deny a patent to a particular drug or to all drugs as long as it has a legitimate health reason to 
                                                 
149 See, UNDP, Human Development Report 2000, [Oxford University Press, New York] 84 (2000).  
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prevent their commercialization. Nevertheless, this provision comes along with a prohibition of 
commercial exploitation of the invention by the country applying the exception..152  
     This prohibition considerably limits the scope of the public health provision. For instance, it 
does not allow for either a non-patent system without restrictions to produce and sell generic 
products or a compulsory licensing mechanism which favors the local generic drugs’ production 
and the development of domestic industry. Both of the methods contemplate a future commercial 
exploitation of generic products.153                    
     For similar reasons, the provision in question does not provide support for alternatives which 
speed generic production or encourage technology transfer, such as shortening patent terms and 
the local working clause. In applying this provision, third-world countries denying patentability 
for essential drugs would have only one way to fulfill their health goals: the free distribution of 
medicines through a state-owned marketing board, quasi-state entity or non-profit 
manufacturers.154              
     In addition to the requirement examined above, a nation seeking to implement the public 
health provision will have to surpass another more difficult obstacle: the measure adopted must 
be deemed necessary. In this matter, relevant precedent, applied by GATT dispute settlement 
panels in interpreting GATT Article XX, will play a central role due to the similarity in language 
and purpose. Prior cases could help to avoid the least trade-restrictive alternative test, which 
constitutes a questioned encroachment on national sovereignty.155            
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     In sum, states should face what seem to be irreconcilable obligations under international law. 
On one hand, there is the duty to protect human life and dignity, while on the other hand, there is  
obligation to confer full IPRS protection. Until now, the balance had been tilted on the IPRS side 
because the respect for the rights comprised in the TRIPS Agreement is backed by the WTO, one 
of the most powerful international organizations in the world.156  
5.3.3 On the Accessibility to IPRs Systems of Developed Countries and Costs to Developing 
Countries of Granting IP Protection 
     The costs to obtain intellectual property protection in a developed country is, for a third- 
world inventor, as much prohibitively expensive as it is for their governments to grant IP rights 
to foreigners. For instance, the patent application process in most developed countries is usually 
very costly and the complexity of legal requirements that an applicant must know and manage 
makes the way particularly adverse for developing country applicants.157 
     On the other hand, the costs of implementing a patent system that adjusts to the characteristics 
that the TRIPS Agreement comprises demands a high percentage of a country’s resources be 
employed in covering administrative expenditures. For instance, only the supply of an efficient 
trained technical personnel for the administration of a patent-granting agency is a need 
considerably more difficult to afford for developing countries.158 To borrow the words of Samuel 
Oddi, in a cost-benefit analysis related to the application of the TRIPS Agreement, the wide 
range of obstacles that developing have to face, place these countries to the cost side.  
     However, the TRIPS Agreement offers some flexibility, which could allow underdeveloped 
societies to benefit from the TRIPS Agreement regime. Their success depends on how the 
agreement is construed and implemented. Thus, the agreement must be interpreted in such a way 
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as to permit third world countries to develop domestic laws that conform to specific national 
concerns and to use intellectual property to further development goals.159    
 
 
                                                 
159 Ruth L. Gana, supra note 120 at 744. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS AND REMARKS 
     The first initiatives toward the creation of the World Trade Organization were carried out 
within the context of World War II. The adverse repercussion that strict protectionist policies had 
on external trade relations led the nations to pursue the establishment of a post-World War 
system to regulate world trade. They were aware that a multilateral, rules-based system would 
attain stability and certainty for international transactions. 
     However, different attempts to constitute what was called the International Trade 
Organization (ITO) failed after various attempts. The failures were due in great part to the 
reticence of the leading trading nations that did not want to leave key aspects of domestic life in 
hands of an international institution. Creating such a powerful organization was seen as a threat 
to their sovereignty. The ITO never came into existence, but the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade became the central organization for coordinating national policies affecting 
international trade. 
     All troubled history shows the true will of the actual members of the WTO in ratifying its 
charter. Since the very beginning, nations sought an institution for international trade cooperation 
which administers the enacted agreements and provides a forum for negotiations and an impartial 
and specialized dispute settlement system instead of a universal authority governing all aspects 
of the members life. 
     The main objective of the members participation in the multilateral system has been to benefit 
from new and improved concessions in areas that confer upon them a comparative advantage at 
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the end of the negotiation process.160 Thus, enlarging the mandate of the WTO to such an extent 
as to cover aspects belonging to domestic spheres is logically perceived as an illegitimate 
intrusion and a deviation of original targets. 
     Nevertheless, although impingement on the states’ sovereignty is by no means desired, the 
WTO regime, as an integral part of an emerging global governance architecture, must be 
coherent with other areas comprising international law. Until recently, the WTO rules had not 
compelled its members to follow determined standards in their domestic law with regard to the 
protection of their own environment or the regulation of labor practices. But the respect of 
nations’ sovereignty doesn’t mean that the trade regime should hinder environmental or social 
goals. 
     The central WTO agreements contemplate exceptions on environmental and labor grounds, 
which permit the members to depart from their trading obligations under determined 
circumstances and conditions. The success of these measures will depend in large part on the 
interpretation adopted by the dispute settlement bodies. So far, the outcome of the WTO 
decisions has not favored the application of unilateral measures or the imposition of trade 
sanctions with environmental or social aims. However, there has been great improvement 
regarding the construction given to the exceptions of GATT Article XX. This new interpretation 
could open the doors to measures adopted for social and environmental concerns.         
     Chapter Three advanced some purposes to allow a larger application of environmental or 
social-friendly measures. Nevertheless, multilaterally adopted policies are preferred for solving 
global problems. Within this background, multinational environmental agreements and 
agreements under the auspices of ILO must be pursued.   
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     It is clear that supporters of the incorporation of labor and environmental standards and their 
enforcement through the WTO, mainly developed countries, have not yet succeeded in proving 
its legitimacy. On the contrary, there is a founded fear that the addition of minimum standards in 
these matters would be used to satisfy protectionist interests.  
     The developed countries’ lack of involvement in environmental or social aims has contributed 
in giving founded reasons for third world countries to be suspicious from their good intentions. 
As argued above, the WTO should coordinate its work with specialized agencies and take into 
account environmental and social objectives in implementing trade policies but should not 
constitute itself in the regulating entity in these matters.  
     One of the most solid arguments against linkage is the existence of other methods of 
responding to social or environmental concerns. These methods would not entail the use of trade 
sanctions for which imply less danger and broader acceptation. Scholars as Srinivasan firmly 
maintain the adequacy of resorting to these less controversial mechanisms. He advances a series 
of more effective and direct measures to improve working conditions in poor countries without 
resorting to the incorporation of minimum standards. Mechanisms, such us lifting immigration 
restrictions in developed countries or taking into account citizens’ actions with market’s 
repercussions, can better serve in the task of achieving legitimate goals.161 
     Also, some of the impacts of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights on third world countries has been examined ane the conclusion is clear. This 
agreement, repeatedly cited as an example of the WTO extending its arms to protect rights other 
than trade, is not always suitable for other sorts of rights and objectives.  
     IPRS are rights that, due to their own nature, are susceptible to trade. The subject matter of 
the rights, namely the innovations, can also be considered objects of commerce that can be 
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bought and sold in the market. The TRIPS Agreement is primarily concerned with restructuring 
and setting the trade rules to prepare the market for this new trade in information goods and 
technology.  
     It is certainly true that trade can affect other areas, such as labor rights and the environment. 
However, these areas are not intimately related to commerce like intellectual property. As a 
result, their incorporation in the trade arena could be antagonistic precisely to those for whom its 
attempts to help. Indeed, it is worthy to highlight how the addition of IP standards within the 
WTO regulation still presents some gaps which keeps developing countries in the periphery, 
preventing them from benefitting from the Agreement.    
     In sum, there are considerable advantages of being part of the multilateral trading system and 
freer trade can be beneficial and profitable. Nevertheless, a balance between private and public 
interest, as well as a more socially-sensible economic regime are indispensable for the system to 
work the way it purports to work.    
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